Abstract. We extend much research that has been devoted to the effects of the EMU on international trade by introducing monetary regime variables in bilateral export equations with the objective of capturing the effects on trade of changes in monetary regimes relative the pure EMU effects. In addition, we make a strong attempt to distinguish between EU and EMU effects on trade. To identify these different effects we include three groups of countries in our sample: EMU countries which are also members of the EU, EU countries outside the EMU and non-EU countries. The last control group consists of either non-EU industrial countries or non-EU industrial plus emerging market countries in the empirical analysis.
Introduction
The perceived success of regional integration in Europe has inspired debate in other parts of the world about potential economic benefits of different types of integration. In Asia in particular, monetary and financial integration has received attention. What are the benefits and how large are they? In this study we focus on trade effects of monetary integration and monetary policy regimes. The formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was associated with a monetary regime shift for most of the countries joining the currency union. Thus, trade creation effects of the currency union per se should be distinguished from trade volume effects of monetary regime shifts. From the point of view of Asian countries we ask whether substantial trade expansion can be achieved by the appropriate choice of monetary and exchange rate regimes without having to take on the political complications associated with a currency union.
We argue that the commonly observed trade creating effect of the formation of the EMU on January 1, 1999 may not be a pure single currency effect but it may be caused by reduced macroeconomic uncertainty in many EMU countries as a result of changes in monetary policy institutions, procedures and targets. Several countries that later became members of the EMU had pre-EMU central banks with little credibility in terms of a monetary policy targets, and the targets shifted strongly towards low inflation with the creation of the EMU. To the extent EMU effects are the result of changes in policy-making institutions, procedures and targets, the lesson from EMU might be that institutions and targets should be changed and the currency union itself could be relatively unimportant.
Inflation targeting has become a common monetary policy regime and it has been observed by, for example, Rose (2007) that this regime contributes to exchange rate predictability in spite of the flexibility of exchange rates associated with this regime. Thus, we may ask whether a shift to inflation targeting can substitute for a currency union for countries seeking to expand trade.
We extend much research that has been devoted to the effects of the EMU on international trade by introducing monetary regime variables in bilateral export equations with the objective of capturing the effects on trade of changes in monetary regimes relative the pure EMU effects. In addition, we make a strong attempt to distinguish between EU and EMU effects on trade. To identify these different effects we include three groups of countries in our sample; EMU countries which are also members of the EU, EU countries outside the EMU and non-EU countries. The last control group consists of either non-EU industrial countries or non-EU industrial plus emerging market countries in the empirical analysis.
The selection of control groups along with other econometric issues are frequently identified as the cause of the sensitivity and discrepancy of the estimates of the common currency effects on trade in different studies (Frankel, 2008) . Rose (2001) , who initiated the research on trade effects of currency unions, found extremely large effects of currency unions on trade. Due to unavailability of trade data for the EMU countries at the time of study, Rose analyzed trade creation effects of currency unions in existence before the EMU. Using a sample covering 186 countries during the period , he finds that the value of trade among countries using the same currency would increase by more than 200 percent.
Most economists found Rose's result implausible. Much research has been devoted to refining the analysis. Although the estimated trade effects of a common currency have been substantially reduced, the magnitude of the effects varies substantially across studies. For example, Persson (2001) finds the trade effect of the common currency of 13%-66%. Drawing conclusions based specifically on the effect of EMU, Micco et al (2003) obtain an intra-EMU trade effect of 7%-10% and Berger and Nitsch (2008) find the effect to be 31%. 1 Frankel (2008) reviews much of the literature with the objective of explaining the discrepancy among the studies. He estimates a gravity model of the euro effect on trade employed in earlier studies. He identifies five possible factors that could explain the discrepancy among estimates among those studies; i) the long-run and lag effects of the euro, ii) the bias from omitting variables capturing specific characteristics of a country pair, iii) causality problems, iv) the implausible magnitude of the estimate, and v) the comparison of the currency union effects for countries with different size. Frankel's estimates of the euro effect on trade lie within a very wide range from 10 percent to 200 percent. He does not introduce alternative monetary regimes, however.
In Frankel's study, the largest euro-effect on trade is found when estimates are obtained within the EU sample. Time series effects are important in this case. The euro effect on bilateral trade flows becomes lower when using the sample of developed countries and even lower or insignificant in the model specification with the full sample including developing countries. The euro effects are also sensitive to the length of the pre-and post-EMU periods in the sample.
Although there is evidence of significantly increasing trade among the EMU member countries Our empirical analysis of EU and EMU effects is based a sample of 68 countries during the period 1980-2007. Taking account of monetary regimes as well, the analysis is limited to the period of 1999-2007. Since the EMU was formed in 1999, the EMU effects identified for this shorter period can be thought of as cross-section effects of the EMU while the longer period takes into account time series effects to a greater extent.
The disadvantage with the longer period from the point of view of drawing implications for Asia is that many unidentified aspects of the deepening integration within the EU may influence the results. We make an attempt to distinguish between EU and EMU effects, however.
The disadvantage with the shorter period wherein cross section effects of the EMU and the EU are more important is that we may miss important effects unless relevant cross-section characteristics of counties can be identified and controlled for.
In the following section 2 we describe the data and empirical methodology on EU-, EMU-and monetary regime effects on bilateral exports. The empirical results with respect to trade effects of the EMU, the EU and monetary regimes are reported in Section 3. In Section 4 trade effects in percent of membership in the EU, the EMU and monetary regime groups are calculated taking into account that membership in these groups are overlapping. Thereafter, we turn in Section 5 to experiences with inflation targeting, in particular, in Asia. We show how trade has developed for four countries that have adopted inflation targeting and interpret these developments in light of the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, lessons for Asia are discussed in the concluding Section 6. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the real value (in U.S. dollar) of bilateral exports from an exporting country (with subscript 1) to an importing country (with subscribe 2) at year t. The exports data are from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (the August, 2009 version). GDP is the real GDP (in U.S. dollar), POP is the total population, and RER is the real exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar. RTA is a dummy of one if two countries belong to the same Regional Trade Arrangement. ν ij denotes the unobserved characteristics of a country pair, μ t denotes the unobservable time effects, and ε ijt is an error term.
Analyzing effects of EU
Our main interest is the two independent variables: EU/EMU and Monetary Regime. To study the currency union effect and the EU effect separately, we group the countries observations into three groups, which are: 1) the member countries of EMU, 2) the EU countries that are not the EMU members including members of the European Economic Area, EEA (EU/nonEMU), and 3) the non-EU countries (nonEU). Table 1 reports the list of countries in each group as well as the year that countries become the members of EMU and EU/nonEMU.
[ Table 1 here]
The important aspect of the EU/nonEMU that we try to capture is the internal market that got a boost with the 1992 program. In creating the "internal market" with the so called "four According to the IMF data, the countries in the Euro Area are counted within the last group.
However, in our empirical analysis the member countries of EMU are treated as inflation target countries as well as members of the EMU group.
[ Table 2 here]
The nature of monetary regimes has implication for the compatibility of exchange rate regimes. They also represent an indirect channel through which the monetary policy has effect on trade through predictability of exchange rates and interest rates in particular. More specifically, the monetary regime data shows that countries that follow inflation targeting and monetary aggregate regimes tend to have more flexible exchange rate policy such as crawling band, managed float with no pre-announced path for exchange rate, and independent float. The
Exchange rate anchor regime involves more rigid exchange rate policy such as arrangements with no separate legal tender, pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands, crawling pegs, and other conventional fixed peg arrangements. The remaining two regimes, IMF supported and 'Other', have countries that practice a variety of exchange rate regimes from exchange rate arrangements with no separate legal tender, managed float, and independent float. Table 3 reports the exchange rate-and monetary regimes for 9 Asian economies from 1999. Note that some countries are classified as adopting more than one nominal anchor in conducting monetary policy within the same period (e.g. China has adopted both exchange rate anchor and monetary aggregate regimes. Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines had adopted the monetary aggregate and IMF-supported during the post-Asian crisis period). According to IMF, it would not be possible to determine which of the two monetary regimes plays the principal role in conducting monetary policy.
[ Table 3 here]
Effects of the EU, the EMU and monetary regimes on bilateral exports
We begin by showing the trade effects of the EMU and the EU in a baseline model without controlling for monetary regime characteristics in Table 4 . Thereafter, monetary regime characteristics are introduced in Table 5 . The regressions in both tables include country-pair and year fixed effects. In Table 4 , we report results based on the sample of industrial alone (IND) and the sample of ALL countries (industrial and emerging market countries). According to previous studies, the control group matters in drawing the conclusion regarding the euro effects on international trade. Most studies include only countries with similar characteristics such as western European or OECD countries on the grounds that developing countries are too different to be useful as a control group. We take into account different country characteristics between industrial and emerging countries by including an interactive dummy for time and emerging market country in the regressions using a sample for ALL countries as exporters or importers.
The baseline panel regressions in Table 4 The eight EU and EMU dummies are generally significant. The magnitude and significance levels of each dummy is compared to the omitted dummy, namely the exports from non-EU to other non-EU countries. In both regressions, the largest coefficient is obtained from bilateral exports between EMU countries (EMU1 to EMU2). The next groups that have relatively large trade effects are between EMU and EU/nonEMU countries, and between EU/NonEMU countries. We discuss the relative magnitudes of coefficients below. Without controlling for different monetary regimes across countries, the results in Table 4 support the trade creation effects of both the adoption of the euro and the formation of internal markets.
The main difference of results in the two regressions in Table 4 is when bilateral trade involves non-EU countries and whether the non-EU country group includes either industrial and emerging market countries or industrial countries alone. In the first regression using the IND sample, all dummies are positive and significant except the coefficient for exports from non-EU to EMU. Using industrial countries as a control group, this result would indicate that the EMU has had a relatively large effect of trade among the member countries as well as from the member countries to all countries outside the EU and EMU. When emerging markets are included in the control group for EU and EMU effects, the coefficients for trade between NonEU countries and EU/NonEMU countries becomes negative indicating that the formation of the EU, as well as the formation of the EMU, may have diverted trade of members of these groups from
Non-EU countries to other members of the same groups. Another possibility discussed below is that the coefficients for trade effects of the EU and the EMU capture other factors that affected the development of trade over time. We return to this issue below.
[ Table 4 here]
The first column in Table 5 shows the regression for the period 1999-2007 with unchanged specification relative to Table 4 regressions. 5 Thus, the EMU effects and the EU effects in Table 5 are dominated by cross-section effects of membership in these groups while the coefficients in Table 4 are influenced strongly by time series effects. If all relevant variables affecting the volume of trade between countries had been included the coefficients should be similar. The coefficients are very different, however, indicating substantial sensitivity to the regression specification as noted by Frankel (2008) . In his study, the EMU effect on trade was significant for the period 1999-2004 but insignificant as in Table 5 when the period of the study was extended to 2006.
Missing variables could affect the cross-section effects of the EMU and the EU in Table   5 as well as the time series effects in Table 4 . All regressions include year-dummies to capture time trends, as well as country pair-dummies to capture unobservable factors affecting trade between country pairs.
[ Table 5 here]
The second regression in Table 5 (Table 6 ).
[ Table 6 here]
4. Bilateral trade effects of joining the EU, the EMU and monetary regimes.
In Tables 7 and 8 we calculate the percent change in total trade of a country in one group with a country in the same or another group from changes in EU and EMU memberships and from adoption of particular monetary regimes. The percent change figures are obtained from the coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 showing effects on log exports. The effects on total trade of, for example, an EMU country with a Non-EU country (row (2) in Table 7 ) is obtained by taking the average of the percent change in exports from an EMU country to a Non-EU country and the percent change in exports of a Non-EU country to an EMU country. In Table 7 , the percent changes in rows (1), (2), (4), (5) and (7) are transformations of the coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 .
The data in these rows are used as inputs in calculations of EMU effects in particular since the EMU countries are also members of the EU and, therefore, subject to both EU and EMU effects.
Joining the EMU may also be associated with a monetary regime shift.
We use The external EMU effect in row (3) is obtained by taking the difference between row (2) showing the change in trade of EMU countries with Non-EU countries and row (1) showing the external EU effect. The result depends on which set of regressions the estimate is based on. The regressions for the longer period in Table 4 indicate a positive external EMU effect while the regressions for the shorter period in Table 5 indicate that joining the EMU adds to the trade diversion of EU membership.
The changes in row (4) refer to the internal EU effect as the percent change in trade between two EU members outside the EMU relative to trade between two non-EU countries.
The estimates of this effect are positive in all cases but they vary between +84 percent and +2.1 percent. The lowest estimate is obtained when monetary regimes are included in the regressions for the period 1999-2007.
Row (5) refers to changes in trade between EMU countries and EU countries outside the EMU relative to trade between Non-EU countries Thus, these changes incorporate the internal EU effect as well as an external EMU effect relative to other EU countries. An external EMU effect relative to EU countries in row (6) can be calculated as the difference between rows (5) and (4).
The external EMU effect relative to EU in row (6) can be compared to the external EMU effect in row (3). There is no obvious reason for these effects to be very different unless EMU and EU effects interact or the estimate of the EMU effect relative to the EU depends on unobservable factors. A comparison between the rows show that the two estimates of the external EMU effect based on data for the shorter time period are consistent while the estimates based on the longer time series are inconsistent and very sensitive to the sample of countries included in the regressions. This observation is a cause for concern with respect to the estimates based on data for the longer period.
Turning to internal bilateral trade effects of EMU membership we produce two alternative estimates in rows (8) and (9). As noted, one estimate is the bilateral internal EMU effect in row (8) defined as the difference between row (7) for the percent increase in internal EMU trade relative to internal non-EU trade and row (4) The estimate of the unilateral internal EMU effect is also very sensitive to the length of the estimation period. Estimates based on Table 4 regression are of the magnitude 100 percent while estimates based on data for the shorter period in Table 5 regressions are of the magnitude 10 percent. It can be noted that controlling for monetary regime of both trading partners increases the estimate of the internal EMU effect from 8 to 13 percent.
The very large estimates of internal EMU effects based on Table 4 The final row in Table 7 shows the trade effect for two countries joining a regional trade arrangement based on the regressions for the period 1980-2007 in Table 4 . These effects are on the same order of magnitude as the internal EMU effects and the internal EU effect.
[ Table 7 here]
In Table 8 trade expansion effects (exports plus imports) of different monetary regimes are shown in percent relative to trade between two countries belonging to the group "Other" in the IMF classification. The regime of the exporting country is shown horizontally while the regime if the importing country is shown vertically. Thus, the diagonal shows the trade effect when both countries belong to the same group. A pattern emerges although the differences among regimes are not statistically significant in Table 6 ER anchor seems to have the second largest effect for importers. Thus, the only unambiguous conclusion we can draw from Table 8 is that inflation targeting contributes to trade expansion independent of the regime of the trading partner.
[ Table 8 here]
Trade expansion and inflation targeting in Asia
The analysis in the previous section indicates that the trade creation effects of regional integration going beyond basic trade policy can be substantial. The reduction in a variety of barriers to mobility of goods and services in Europe has been in process for several decades within the EU framework. A range of political forces arising in the aftermath of World War II played an important part in motivating the European countries to trade off a degree of sovereignty against increased political and economic integration. There are no obvious similar political motivations for Asian countries to emulate the European model for both widening and deepening integration in the foreseeable future.
Monetary regime shifts can be implemented by a country without coordination with other countries. The results presented in the previous section indicate that inflation targeting, in particular, expands international trade even if trading partners do not adopt the same regime. In this section we take a closer look at the development of international trade of inflation targeting countries in Asia.
There are many case studies on emerging markets' economic performance under inflation targeting. Most of these studies look at output and inflation and focus on the sample of Latin American and emerging transition countries. In general, these countries adopted inflation targeting for the purpose of disinflation. Monetary policy consideration cannot be disentangled from exchange rate policy.
Inflation targeting requires exchange rate flexibility. When adopting inflation targeting, most countries accept that market fundamentals determine the exchange rates although there are varying degrees of foreign exchange market intervention. Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000) note that under inflation targeting "exchange rate stability can be defined as a policy framework with an exchange rate value credible enough to convince markets that the inflation target will not be threatened by a currency crisis." (p. 19). This statement implies that there are constraints on intervention under inflation targeting but intervention can contribute to a degree of exchange rate stability as long as the exchange rate is consistent with longer term fundamentals.
Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer find in case studies of six emerging countries 8 , that six of the countries experienced several years of sound macroeconomic policies and exchange rate stability after the adoption of inflation targeting. The exception was Brazil where the exchange rate was under pressure in 1999.
Rose (2007) In other words, the latter countries have neither a pegged exchange rate nor a floating rate.
Although they do not announce an exchange rate target they are likely to have one. Observation of the diagrams in Figure 2 alone gives the impression of a negative effect on the export ratio of inflation targeting. Thus, the positive effect on trade of the inflation target regime observed in the analysis in the previous section is conditional on controlling for real exchange rate changes. The shift to inflation targeting may cause a real appreciation for a period because the monetary regime shift is often associated with a shift towards a more disciplined macroeconomic policy. The real appreciation should be temporary, however. Therefore, the trade creating effect of a shift to inflation targeting may not be observable during an adjustment period.
[ Figure 2 here]
Conclusions and Implications
Searching for a stable monetary regime is a challenge for central bankers around the world and a crucial issue among Asian policymakers for two reasons. First, Asian crisis-hit economies during 1997-98 were forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate system. Since then, the exchange rates The dependent variable is the log of real exports. *, ** indicate the significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively. 1 stands for an exporting country and 2 for an importing country. For the sample, IND = industrial countries and ALL = industrialized countries plus emerging markets. The dependent variable is the log of real exports. *, ** indicate the significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively. 1 stands for an exporting country and 2 for an importing country. For the sample, IND = industrial countries and ALL = industrialized countries plus emerging markets. The RTA dummy is dropped in the country-and time-fixed effect model due to time-invariant of the data after 1999. The number in the parenthesis is the probability value of the F-statistics. Table 7 . EU, EMU and RTA effects in percent on bilateral trade within and between members of different country groups (EU stands for the EU/NonEMU group). Effects on bilateral trade are calculated as the averages of percent change in exports and percent change in imports based on coefficients in log in tables 4 and 5. Rows (1), (2), (4), (5) and (7) refer to percent change relative to trade between NonEU countries. Rows in bold font show estimates for internal and external effects of the EU and the EMU. Row (3) refers to differences between the changes in row (2) and row (1) calculated as [(100+change in row (2))/(100+change in row (1))]-1. Row (6) refers to difference between changes in rows (5) and row (4), row 8 refers to difference between rows (7) and (4) while row (9) refers to the difference between rows (7) and (5) Calculated from Table 4  Table 4 Table 5 (no monetary regime dummies) Period 1980 Period -2007 Period 1980 Period -2007 Period 1999 Period -2007 Period 1999 Period -2007 (1) Non-EU to/from EU (External EU-effect) +18. 
